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An Analysis of Models for Mortgage Backed Securities
Abstract
The U.S. agency mortgage backed securities (MBS) market is deep and highly liquid, yet mod-
eling MBS is extremely challenging. This paper applies market participants' desired requirements
for a good pricing model to MBS pricing models provided by six of the top MBS dealers. We nd
that ve out of the six models fall short of the desired requirements. The ve models are highly
correlated, but less correlated with the best model, indicating potential herding among MBS ana-
lysts. The most undesirable property of the failed models is the high correlation with the underlying
interest rate and options markets.What Constitutes a Good Model?
An Analysis of Models for Mortgage Backed Securities
The value of a good pricing model lies in its capability in explaining market prices. This is es-
pecially true in large liquid markets where one expects the full application of the Efcient Market
Hypothesis (EMH). Unfortunately, many of the more interesting and complicated markets in the xed
income universe are too illiquid or lack enough publicly available data for accurate market versus
model comparisons.1 An exception is the U.S. agency mortgaged backed securities (MBS) market.
This is a deep and highly liquid market that nevertheless offers researchers a serious challenge due to
the homeowner's prepayment option.
Large research departments at many Wall Street rms are dedicated to developing ever more com-
plicated models for pricing MBS. The task is complicated due to the sub-optimal monthly exercise of
the homeowner's prepayment option over a 30-year maturity. Nevertheless the industry has arrived at
a standard for expressing relative value in the MBS market known as Option Adjusted Spread (OAS)
(See Hayre (2001)). OAS measures the difference, in basis points, between the returns of MBS and a
replicating portfolio of Libor/swap and swaptions over the life of the mortgage. For example, an OAS
of ten basis points is the annualized excess return that one expects over the life of the MBS compared
to holding a replicating portfolio of swaps and swaptions, all at today's prices. Therefore, the larger the
OAS values, the cheaper is the mortgage and vice versa. In their effort to win clients and to generate
trading ideas, most Wall Street rms provide their clients with a daily run of OAS values on a number
of more liquid mortgage securities. These values are different across rms due to the choice of the
interest rate dynamics as well as the prepayment function. This provides us with a great opportunity to
test and compare these models.
But what constitutes a test of a good pricing model? What are the most desired properties of such
amodel? Toanswerthesequestions, wesentaquestionnairetoanumberofacademicsandpractitioners
involved in the design or trading of nancial pricing models. From responses to the questionnaire, we
1One example is the long dated cap and swaption market where out-of-the-money pricing data are to this date unavailable
to the general public.drew a wish list of properties that determine the goodness of a model. We then used four years of daily
OAS values obtained from six of the top dealers in the U.S. MBS market to investigate their properties
against our wish list. The results of our study can be summarized as follows,
1. All but one model fail against our wish list for a good model. The most undesirable property
in most models is the high correlation of the OAS series with the underlying interest rate and
interest rate option markets. In a fully hedged portfolio, this property could result in prots and
losses that are market directional.
2. There does not exist one dominant principal component in the OAS time series produced by
the six models, indicating that the results are not noisy variations of the same valuation model.
However, we nd that the ve failed models are highly correlated with one another, and less
correlated with the best model. The high correlation among the ve failed models may indicate
herding among the MBS research analysts, which may lead the entire ock over the proverbial
cliff.
3. Assuming that the MBS market is relatively efcient, we estimate the model risk associated with
the best model at ten basis points.
Inrelatedliterature, Breeden(1994)analyzesthecomplexityinherentinthehedgingofthemortgage-
backed securities. Brown(1999)studiesthedetermination ofexpected returnonmortgagebackedsecu-
rities based on the OAS and shows how the expected return depends both on general market conditions
and contract specic factors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is a brief overview of the mortgage
market and the OAS data set. Section 2 describes our questionnaire and summarizes the responses.
Section 3 contains results on the statistical analysis of the OAS time series. Section 4 examines the
question of arbitrage opportunities and model risk. Section 5 concludes.
21 Overview of the U.S. Mortgage Market
The agency mortgage market in the US has evolved into one of the largest and most liquid xed income
sectors in the world and in recent years it has outpaced even the US treasury market in size. Driven
by the combination of low interest rates and a booming housing market, the size of the market is now
nearly $4 trillion with daily trading volume exceeding $150 billion per day,2 an amount that represents
nearly half the volume of the U.S. treasury market (excluding T-bills and short-term coupon bonds).
Currently, the agency mortgage market is the single largest xed income asset class and comprises 32
percent of the Merrill Lynch US High Grade Bond Index.
The size and efciency of the mortgage market is a result of the collective effort of a team of spe-
cialized government sponsored enterprises (GSE's) and Wall Street dealers. Through specic charters
to encourage mortgage lending, the GSE's, better known as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
MAC, guarantee the borrowers' interest and principal, thereby eliminating the credit risk embedded
in each mortgage. By pooling together individual mortgages and guaranteeing the loans, they allow
mortgages to trade almost homogenously to the investing public through the brokerage community,
thus creating a deep and liquid secondary market.
While mortgages are originated in varying maturities ranging from ve to 30 years with both xed
and oating-rate coupons, the predominant choice by borrowers is the 30-year xed rate mortgage,
which represents nearly half of all outstanding mortgages. Furthermore, at any given time, the most
liquid and heavily traded 30-year mortgage usually has a coupon rate that makes the mortgage value
closesttopar. Suchamortgageisknownasthecurrentcouponmortgage. Thereasonfortheliquidityof
the current coupon mortgage is a steady, but technical, supply-demand balance. The supply originates
from mortgage bankers who are renancing existing mortgage holders or creating new mortgages for
rst time home buyers. The demand arises from a gamut of investors most notably, Fannie Mae and
Freddie MAC who, in addition to guaranteeing mortgages, also maintain a portfolio for investment
2Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 2003, Total Primary Dealer Transactions Volume in US Government and
Federal Agency Securities Market Share.
3purposes. The two GSE's reinvestment needs and portfolio growth targets help fuel the largest demand
for mortgages. Combined, the two agencies control nearly 40 percent of all outstanding mortgages.
MBS demand also comes from index managers, pension funds, banks, and hedge funds. With the
natural balance of supply and demand, current coupon mortgage trading represents nearly half of all
daily trading volume. In normal trading days, the current coupon mortgage generally trades on a 1/64th
bid-offer spread for up to a $100 million block.
Because of the liquidity and price transparency, we choose the 30-year current coupon mortgage
as our benchmark security to test Wall Street's OAS models. Our data set consists of daily current
coupon mortgage OAS from April 29, 1999 through April 14, 2003 (989 business days), contributed
from six of the largest dealers in mortgage securities.3 The reported OAS are calculated from each
dealer's proprietary interest rate and prepayment models.
2 What is a good model?
To determine what characterizes a good model, we sent the following questionnaire to a number of peo-
ple involved in either design of nancial pricing models or model-based trading of nancial instruments
(model-based arbitrage).
Let p denote the market price of a security, and v to be the true value of that security
derived from a model proposed by the God of Finance. Furthermore, dene the residual
as the difference between the market price and the true value of the security and denote it
by r, namely r = p v.
1. Does EMH require r = 0 at all time? Under what conditions do we have non-zero
r?
2. In markets in which you are involved, is r = 0? If not, why?
3The ranking of the dealers is compiled by Greenwich Associates for year 2002.
43. Suppose that the God of Finance has a number of not-so-talented but otherwise
identical siblings. How do we choose among models proposed by this group? What
is your wish list of properties that characterize an ideal pricing model?
Most participants agree that under EMH r = 0 should hold. Nevertheless, they acknowledge the
potential existence of temporal non-zero r due either to market frictions or short-term supply/demand
imbalances. In answering the second question, all participants agree that r is non-zero at their respec-
tive market based on their respective model. Furthermore, the magnitudes of r are often larger than the
transaction costs for their particular markets. However, the reasons are clearly divided along the aca-
demic/practictioner lines. The academics believe that large non-zero r's are signs of model deciency;
whereas the practitioners believe that, even in highly liquid markets, large r can exists and points to a
potentially protable trading opportunity. In retrospect, the dichotomy of responses is not surprising.
They are both economically based and self-serving: The rst group makes a living explaining arbi-
trages away whereas the second group makes a living trading arbitrages away. Interestingly enough,
both groups have more or less similar answers to the last question. The following is a consensus set of
the wish list for the ideal model,
1. The time series of r should not exhibit a time trend or regime change. Furthermore, in an in-
creasingly efcient market, the rolling variance estimate of r should be a non-increasing function
of time.
2. The probability distribution of r should be symmetric around its mean. The autocorrelation of r
should be small and should show rapid decay. All things equal, all respondents prefer a model
that produces a higher number of mean-crossings.
3. The residual r should be independent of true value v, or any systematic movement of the under-
lying market.
In addition, one practitioner (a true Cartesian) considered the possibility of a malicious identical
sibling who provides him with a devious money-losing model and added the following condition,
4. Residuals from all competing models should be highly positively correlated. Any lack of corre-
lation or negative correlation should raise a ag.
5In what follows, we apply the above criteria to compare the competing models in the US MBS
market. For that purpose, we treat the current-coupon MBS as a derivative instrument on the US swap
and swaption market, and the OAS value as the residual r dened above, but measured in terms of
annual returns.
3 Statistical Analysis of the OAS Time Series
This section measures the statistical properties of the six OAS series and compares them along the
criteria obtained from the survey. We assume that these six OAS series are from six different models,
henceforth labelled as model 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively. By so doing, we avoid revealing the
identity of the six rms involved. Whenever applicable in graphical representations, we denote the rst
model by a solid line, model 2 by a dashed line, model 3 by a dash-dotted line, model 4 by a dotted line,
model 5 by crosses, and model 6 by diamonds. The analysis is performed in four parts, corresponding
to the four listed properties. First, we investigate whether the six OAS series contain any time trend
in their levels and rolling volatility estimates. Second, we report and analyze the general statistical
properties of the six series, including the sample moments and serial correlations for each series. Third,
we examine the cross-correlations among the six OAS series. Finally, we examine whether the OAS
series are correlated with any systematic movement in the interest rate and interest rate options market.
3.1 Time Trend in OAS and its Volatility
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the OAS time series of the six models. For ease of comparison, we
standardize the six series by demeaning rst and then dividing the demeaned series by their respective
sample standard deviation. Most of the six series lay above one another and share a similar time trend.
The only exception is the dotted line (model 4), which exhibits less time trend. The right panel of
6Figure 1 plots the time trend estimates (circle-sold line) and their 95 percent condence bands (dash-
dotted lines). The time trend for each series is estimated via the following simple regression,
OASt = a+Gt +et;
where the OAS series is standardized, t denotes time in years and G denotes the annul growth estimate.
While the time trend estimates for all six series are positive, the time trend estimate for model 4 is much
lower than for the other ve models.
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the time series of the 100-day rolling volatility estimates of the six
series. Again, the estimates are based on standardized series and the volatility estimates are further
normalized by the rst estimate. We do not observe any obvious decline over time in the volatility
estimates. Instead, some of the series exhibit several volatility spikes more recently, most notable is the
model 5 (crossed) and model 6 (diamonds).
The right panel in Figure 2 plots the growth rate estimates (circle-solid line) and 95 percent con-
dence bands (dash-dotted lines) on the volatility based on the following regression,
lnvolt = a+bt +et;
where volt denotes the 100-day rolling volatility estimate. The plotted growth rates estimates are in
annualized percentages. We observe that the estimated time trend is positive for model 2, 5, and 6. The
trends in volatility in model 1, 3, and 4 are less signicant. Thus, the volatility of the residuals are not
declining over time, but increasing for some models.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the six OAS series. The columns under G report the annual
growth estimate on each series and GSTD denotes the standard error of the growth estimates, based on
standardized series. The growth estimates are statistically signicant for all six models. The largest
7time trend comes from Model 5, smallest from Model 4. The ve models (1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) have similar
growth trends, while model 4 has markedly smaller time trends.
NCR measures the number of mean crossings based on each demeaned and detrended series. Mod-
els 2, 5, and 6 have smaller number of crossing compared to the other three models (1, 3, and 4). The
rst model has the most mean crossing, and its mean value is also close to zero. The largest mean OAS
come from models 2 and 5, so do the largest standard deviation estimates.
All six series exhibit very small skewness, implying that the distribution of the six series are all
relatively symmetric. The excess kurtosis estimates are also small, implying that there are not many
abrupt adjustments.
All six model series exhibit strong serial dependence. The lowest serial dependence comes from
model 4, highest from models 2 and 5. Furthermore, the serial correlation decays very slowly, much
slower than implied from an AR(1) specication.4 The slow decay of the autocorrelation function
implies that the OAS spreads are likely to stay away from the mean for a long time before reverting
back to the mean.
3.3 Cross-Correlation and Co-Movement
Table 2 reports the cross-correlation matrix between the six OAS series, measured on levels in the left
panel and daily changes in the right panel. First, the correlations measured on levels are much stronger
than the correlations measured on daily changes, implying that they may share some common trend,
but also exhibit independent daily variation.
Whether the correlation is measured on levels or daily differences, we observe strong correlations
between models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. In contrast, model 4 seems to be relatively independent of the other
ve models. When measured on levels, the average cross-correlation between the ve models is about
4For example, based on the daily rst order autocorrelation estimates, the 20th order autocorrelation would be 0.54, 0.87,
0.70, 0.17, 0.87, 0.54, respectively for the six models based on an AR(1) specication. In contrast, the estimated 20th-order
autocorrelations for the six series are, respectively, 0.85, 0.93, 0.90, 0.55, 0.93, 0.77, all much larger than implied from the
AR(1) specication.
80.9 while their correlation with model 4 is about 0.5. When measured on daily differences, the average
cross-correlation for the ve models is about 0.4, but their correlations with model 4 are all less than
0.1. Our suspicious Cartesian friend (Section 2, response 4) warns of the possibility of a malicious
sibling here. As we will see in the next section, the malicious outnumber the virtuous by ve to one.
Figure3plotstheresultsoftheprincipalcomponentanalysisonthesixseries. Theleftpanelreports
the percentage variance explained by each principal component, computed based on the eigenvalues of
the covariance matrix. The right panel denotes the loading the six principal components, represented by
the six eigenvectors. Whether the performance is based on levels or daily changes, we cannot identify
one predominant component. These six models are not driven by one factor. Hence, they are not noisy
variations of the same model.
3.4 Correlations with the Systematic Movements in Interest Rates and Interest Rate
Options
Anidealmodelshouldgenerateresidualseriesr thatare, evenifnotzero, independentofanysystematic
movements in the underlying market. This subsection investigates whether the six OAS series are
correlated with systematic movements in interest rates and in interest rate options. For this purpose,
we collect the LIBOR and swap rates. The LIBORs are at maturities of one, three, six months, and the
swap rates are at maturities of one, two, three, four, ve, seven, ten, twelve, fteen, 20, and 30 years.
We also collect at-the-money caps and swaptions. The caps are one one-year LIBOR and with option
maturities of one, one, two, three, four, ve, seven, ten, twelve, fteen, 20, and 30 years. The swaptions
are on swaps ar maturities of one, two, three, four, ve, seven, ten, 12, 15, 20, 25, and 30 years. For
each underlying swap rate, the option maturities include one, two, three, four, ve, seven, and ten years.
We rst perform principal component analysis to extract the rst three factors from the interest
rate data. We also extract the rst three principal components from the implied volatility data on the
interest rate options. We then measure the correlation between each of the six OAS series with the
six principal components, three each from the interest rate market and the interest rate options market.
These correlation estimates are reported in Table 3.
9We observe that the OAS series from ve of the six models exhibit very high correlation with the
rst factor in interest rates and the rst factor in interest rate implied volatilities. The correlations with
other principal components decline. The only series that exhibit low correlation with the principal
components in interest rates and interest rate options is from model 4.
These results indicate that most of the outstanding models generate residuals that are highly corre-
lated with the systematic movement in both the interest rate market and the options market. In a fully
hedged portfolio, this property could result in prot and loss that is market directional. Indeed, most
seasoned market participants realize this issue and have been under-hedging their MBS portfolios com-
pared to the models. For example, the quarterly reports from the Government Sponsored Enterprises,
e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, often show a systematic under-hedging in the options market.
More interestingly, however, the ve models that are highly correlated with one another are also
highly correlated with the systematic movements in interest rates and interest rate options. Model
4 is relatively independent of other models, and it is also relatively uncorrelated with the systematic
movements in interest rates and interest rate options. Furthermore, Model 4 also exhibits less time
trend and lower serial dependence, and thus comes closest to our wish list for a good model. Therefore,
we identify possible herding behavior among the research analysts in the MBS market. Furthermore,
it is interesting that the one outlier is actually the best model.
4 Mirages and Arbitrages
In an efcient MBS market, using an ideal model, one expects most OAS values to fall in a band,
representing transaction costs, around the mean. In addition, any excursions outside of this band, due
to temporary market imbalances, are expected to be few and short-lived.
Our study indicates that out of the six models, model 4 performs best against our wish list of an
ideal pricing model. The OAS series from model 4 has little time trend, stable rolling volatility, and
low correlation to the underlying interest rate and interest rate options. In this section, we compare
10the OAS values generated from this model to what is expected from an ideal model in an efcient
market.
The left panel in Figure 4 plots the histogram of the time series of OAS values from model 4. The
number of level-crossings for various bands around the mean, representing transaction cost, are plotted
in the right panel. Here, level-crossing is dened as any one-sided crosses of the band, including up
crosses of the upper band and down crosses of the lower band.
The average transaction cost in fully hedging and maintaining a current coupon position is about
ve basis points.5 From Figure 4, we observe 87 crossings at the ve basis point level over the sample
period of four years, an average of one crossing over every two weeks. If each crossing represents an
arbitrage opportunity, these many crossings would point to a highly inefcient market.
Is this a case of a large, highly liquid market exhibiting many arbitrage opportunities, or is it just
a mirage? If the market participants saw these crossings as potentially protable trading opportunities
and acted on them quickly, we would expect these crossings to revert quickly to within the band. We
hence would also expect the OAS series to exhibit small serial dependence and expect the autocorrela-
tion function to decay rapidly over time. Figure 5 plots the autocorrelation function for the OAS series
from model 4. The rst order autocorrelation is over 0.9 and hence is anything but small. More trou-
bling is the slow decay of the autocorrelation function, which exhibits a half life of over 25 business
days (ve weeks).6 This slow decay implies that the market participants are not acting on the crossings
at the ve basis point level as actively as one would expect from the pure arbitrage perspective.
A potential explanation is that the market participants assign a wider band than the ve basis points
estimated from purely transaction costs. The extra width of the band may come from an additional
cushion for model risk. All mortgage valuation models rely heavily on projections from a histori-
5The hedging cost is composed of three components: (1) three points on the swap rate curve for interest rate hedges at a
cost of 1.5 basis points, (2) three additional points on the volatility surface for option hedge at 2.5 basis points, and (3) one
basis point for coupon swaps to keep the MBS portfolio at Current Coupon. See Dynkin, Hyman, Konstantiovsky, and Mattu
(2000) for a similar discussion. The number of systematic factors in the interest rate and interest rate options markets is based
on the empirical analysis of Heidari and Wu (2003).
6The half life is dened as the number of lags (days) at which the autocorrelation declines to one half of the rst-order
autocorrelation.
11cally based prepayment function. A serious drawback of these models is that they perform poorly
out-of-sample (Longstaff (2003)). To keep the models up-to-date, the prepayment functions are reg-
ularly re-estimated. At times, this could result in drastic changes of the OAS values. In fact, merely
considering the range of sample means and standard deviations (20.25 basis points, and 15.15 basis
points respectively) reported on the six models in Table 1, one can obtain a sense for the magnitude of
model risk in valuing MBS. In addition to prepayments, there are inherent risks/uncertainties associated
with the choice of dynamic term structure models. For a comprehensive review of the dynamic term
structure models, see Chapman and Pearson (2001) and Yan (2001).
Although it is difcult to quantify and price model risk, model performance statistics similar to
ones reported here should help in identifying its magnitude. For example, if we set the level-crossing
band at 15 basis points, there are merely three crossings during the entire four-year sample period.
Thus, assuming that the MBS market is relatively efcient and without many arbitrage opportunities,
we can infer from Figure 4 that the market adds approximately ten basis points, on top of the ve basis
points transaction cost, as a cushion to compensate for model risk. This ten basis point value seems
reasonable in comparison to the range of mean OAS (20.25 basis points) generated from the six models
studied here.
5 Conclusions
In this study, we analyze the statistical properties of six MBS valuation models against a wish list of
desired properties. The wish list is derived from a survey of market participants, researchers, as well as
practitioners, on ideal model properties. The conclusions of our study are as follows,
1. Only one out of the six models studied has properties close to the ideal model. The most un-
desirable property in most models is the high correlation of the OAS series with the underlying
interest rate and interest rate option markets. In a fully hedged portfolio, this property could
result in prots and losses that are market directional.
122. There does not exist one dominant principal component in the OAS time series produced by
the six models, indicating that the results are not noisy variations of the same valuation model.
However, we nd that the ve failed models are highly correlated with one another, and less
correlated with the best model. The high correlation among the ve failed models may indicate
herding among the MBS research analysts, which may lead the entire ock over the proverbial
cliff.
3. Assuming that the MBS market is relatively efcient, we estimate the model risk associated with
the best model at ten basis points.
More broadly, this study shows the difculties in modeling complex nancial securities, even in
markets as liquid as the U.S. mortgage-backed securities. Furthermore, it warns the investors against
taking any single, or even a consensus, model at face value. Simple analysis, similar to those performed
here, can help identify the good models and separate them from the bad and the ugly. Moreover, the
application of the efcient market hypothesis may be a rst step in quantifying the magnitude of model
risk in complex but liquid markets.
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Figure 1: Time Series of OAS and its Time Trend Estimates
The left panel depicts the time series of the OAS from the six models. The OAS series are standardized:
demeaned and divided by their sample standard deviation. The right panel depicts the growth rate
estimates (circles) and the 95 percent condence band (triangles) on the estimates for the six series.































































Figure 2: Time Series of the 100-day rolling Volatility and its Time Trend Estimates
The left panel depicts the time series of the 100-day rolling volatility estimates for the six OAS series.
The volatilities are estimated based on standardized residuals with a 100-day rolling window. The
volatility estimates are then normalized by the rst estimate of the time series. The right panel depicts
the time trend estimates for the six volatility series (circles) and their 95 percent condence band
(triangles).

















































































































































Figure 3: Principal Component Analysis
The left panels depict the percentage explained variance of the six principal components and the right
panels plot the corresponding eigenvectors. The top panels are based on principal component analysis
on levels while the bottom panels are based on daily differences.































































Figure 4: Histogram of the OAS Series from Model 4 and Number of Crossings
The left panel plots the histogram of the OAS series from Model 4. The right panel plots the number
of crossings at different OAS magnitudes in the series.



































Figure 5: The Autocorrelation Function
The solid line is the autocorrelation function of the OAS series from model 4. The dash-dotted line is
implied from the AR(1) assumption and based on the rst-order autocorrelation estimate.
17Table 1: Summary Statistics of OAS Series
Entries are summary statistics of the six OAS series. G and GSTD denote the annual time trend estimate and
standard deviation, based on the following regression,
OASt = a+Gt +et
where OASt denotes the standardized OAS series, t is in years so that G denotes annual growth. NCR denotes
the number of crossing of zero for the regression residual et. Mean, STD, Skew, Kurt, and Auto(k) denote,
respectively, the sample estimates of the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and kth-order daily au-
tocorrelation. The data are daily OAS values from ve dealers, from April 29, 1999 to April 14, 2003 (989
observations).
Model G GSTD NCR Mean STD Skew Kurt Autocorrelations
1 5 10 20
1 0.72 0.01 143 0.00 11.04 0.03 -1.03 0.97 0.90 0.86 0.85
2 0.77 0.01 79 14.56 16.77 0.17 -1.33 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.93
3 0.70 0.02 133 3.08 12.88 0.06 -1.19 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.90
4 0.26 0.03 131 1.41 5.80 -0.15 -0.20 0.92 0.74 0.63 0.55
5 0.78 0.01 73 20.25 30.95 0.02 -1.47 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93
6 0.55 0.02 88 5.92 8.98 0.41 -0.34 0.97 0.88 0.82 0.77
Table 2: Cross-Correlation Between the Six OAS Series
Entries report the cross-correlation matrix of the six OAS series, based on levels on the left panel and daily
differences on the right panel. The data are daily OAS values from April 29, 1999 to April 14, 2003 (989
observations).
Levels Differences
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.57 0.85 0.82 1.00 0.45 0.56 0.03 0.20 0.37
2 0.91 1.00 0.96 0.48 0.94 0.82 0.45 1.00 0.51 0.04 0.27 0.33
3 0.91 0.96 1.00 0.52 0.90 0.86 0.56 0.51 1.00 0.02 0.26 0.39
4 0.57 0.48 0.52 1.00 0.43 0.58 0.03 0.04 0.02 1.00 -0.01 0.07
5 0.85 0.94 0.90 0.43 1.00 0.71 0.20 0.27 0.26 -0.01 1.00 0.19
6 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.58 0.71 1.00 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.07 0.19 1.00
18Table 3: Cross-Correlation Between the Six OAS Series and Systematic Movements in Interest
Rates and Interest Rate Options
Entries report the cross-correlation of the six OAS series with the rst three principal components from the
LIBOR and swap series and the rst three principal components from the cap and swaption implied volatilities.
The left panel are measured on levels whereas in the right panel the correlations are measured between daily
changes in the OAS series and the principal components from the daily changes in interest rates and interest rate
options.
Levels Differences
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Factors A. Correlation with Interest Rate Movements
1 -0.86 -0.96 -0.93 -0.34 -0.93 -0.73 -0.06 -0.27 -0.14 -0.03 -0.29 -0.18
2 0.30 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.34 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.01
3 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.26 0.56 0.35 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.08
B. Correlation with Interest Rate Option Movements
1 -0.79 -0.91 -0.87 -0.24 -0.84 -0.71 -0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.18 0.01
2 -0.33 -0.35 -0.38 -0.34 -0.51 -0.23 -0.18 -0.00 -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.10
3 0.08 -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.12
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